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UNHCR publishes detailed observations raising concerns over the Immigration and Asylum Bill

Summary

30-page observations devote significant attention to the proposed new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority

By EIN
Date of Publication:
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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) last week published detailed observations on the Government's Immigration and Asylum Bill.

You can read a full copy of the observations below and you can download the original 30-page PDF file here.

The Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on 30 June 2026, proposes a significant restructuring of parts of the UK's immigration and asylum system, including the appeals process. As the UNHCR observes, among the Bill's proposals are the creation of a new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, changes intended to speed up appeals and removals, reforms to the interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the introduction of a single protection status in place of the current distinction between refugee status and humanitarian protection.

In its observations, UNHCR welcomes the Government's stated aim of creating an asylum system that is fairer, more efficient and sustainable, including efforts to reduce decision-making backlogs, improve the quality of asylum decisions, strengthen returns for people found not to need international protection, and strengthen cooperation with international partners. It also acknowledges the UK's long-standing role in providing sanctuary to people fleeing persecution and conflict.

However, the UN refugee agency says several provisions of the Bill merit further consideration and it warns that some of the proposed reforms could weaken safeguards that are fundamental to fair asylum procedures and could undermine the conditions needed for successful integration of refugees.

A significant part of UNHCR's observations concerns the proposed Independent Immigration Appeals Authority (IIAA), which would take over a broad range of appeals currently heard by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).

UNHCR says it supports the Government's aim of reducing the appeals backlog and speeding up decisions, and welcomes provision for IIAA decisions to be appealed to the Upper Tribunal on an error of law. It notes that between 36% and 40% of protection refusals were overturned on appeal in each quarter between April 2025 and March 2026, highlighting that independent review is important in identifying errors and preventing wrongful returns.

The observations, however, raise a number of concerns about the proposed operation of the new IIAA. UNHCR states: "UNHCR is concerned that aspects of the proposed framework risk falling short of these stated objectives and may undermine the quality, fairness and effectiveness of asylum appeals. […] UNHCR notes that many key aspects of the IIAA's operation are not defined in the Bill itself but will instead be left to future regulations and procedure rules. As a result, a number of important questions regarding its structure, operation and applicable safeguards remain unanswered. These include, amongst other matters, the respective roles of legally trained senior adjudicators and lay executive adjudicators, the precise scope of the IIAA's review function, the circumstances in which appeals may be determined without an oral hearing, and the procedural safeguards that will apply in practice. This lack of detail necessarily limits the extent to which the proposed system can be fully assessed at this stage."

The Bill would also require people facing removal or deportation to set out, within a specified period, all the reasons why they should not be removed, with a new process applying where protection claims or other grounds are raised after that deadline. UNHCR accepts the need to address deliberately late submissions, but says there can be legitimate reasons for delay, including trauma, fear and difficulties obtaining legal advice. It is concerned that late disclosure could unfairly affect credibility and recommends that late evidence should not automatically count against an appellant.

While UNHCR welcomes the Government's commitment to early legal advice, it says further detail is needed on how this will work in practice.

The observations note: "Quality legal representation is essential for those seeking to appeal a refusal of protection status. This will become even more so if adjudicators hearing appeals are not themselves legally qualified and if the clauses in the Bill providing for credibility to be treated as damaged where directions of the IIAA are not complied with or when deadlines are missed are enacted."

A full copy of the observations follows below.

UNHCR OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM BILL

AUGUST 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would like to provide these observations on the Immigration and Asylum Bill, Bill 105 2026-27, as introduced to the House of Commons on 30 June 2026. [1]

2. UNHCR offers these Observations as the agency entrusted by the United Nations General Assembly with the responsibility for providing international protection to refugees and other persons within its mandate, and for assisting governments in seeking permanent solutions to the problem of refugees, [2] and pursuant to its duty to supervise the application of the 1951 Convention relating the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (together, "the Refugee Convention"). [3] The UN General Assembly has also entrusted UNHCR with a global mandate to provide protection to stateless persons worldwide and for preventing and reducing statelessness. [4] UNHCR thus has a direct interest in the implementation of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons ("1954 Convention") and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness ("1961 Convention"). [5] These Observations focus on the matters of greatest relevance to UNHCR's mandate, and do not seek to address every aspect of the Bill.

3. The measures contained in the Immigration and Asylum Bill ("the Bill") are intended to provide the legislative basis for several of the reforms announced by the Government in its Restoring Order and Control policy statement published in November 2025.

4. While the Bill does not give effect to all aspects of the Restoring Order and Control policy statement, it provides further detail on several key proposals and clarifies how the reforms are intended to operate in practice. Among other measures, the Bill would establish a new Independent Immigration Appeals Authority (IIAA); introduce reforms designed to accelerate the determination of appeals and facilitate removals; amend the statutory framework governing the interpretation of Article 8 ECHR in immigration cases, including by defining the circumstances in which family life will be recognised; create a single form of protection status in place of the current distinction between refugee status and humanitarian protection; amend provisions concerning the interpretation of "lawfully staying" in the context of the application of Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention; and introduce powers to recover certain asylum support and accommodation costs. The Bill therefore represents a significant restructuring of elements of the UK's asylum, appeals and immigration framework.

5. UNHCR issued detailed observations on the Government's proposals outlined in the Restoring Order and Control policy statement in January 2026. [6] In May 2026, UNHCR shared with the Government its paper International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body. [7] The present observations build on UNHCR's earlier comments by considering the provisions of the Bill and the additional detail now available, and should be read alongside those documents.

6. UNHCR wishes to acknowledge the UK's long-standing tradition of providing sanctuary to those fleeing persecution and conflict, as well as the Government's commitment to maintaining public confidence in the asylum system through reforms aimed at improving its fairness, efficiency and sustainability. As the international community marks the 75th anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is important to recall the Refugee Convention's enduring role as a life-saving framework for the protection of people forced to flee persecution and the importance of ensuring its continued effectiveness for future generations. UNHCR therefore welcomes the Government's objective of ensuring that the UK can continue providing protection to those in need while addressing operational challenges within the asylum system, including reducing decision-making backlogs, improving the quality of asylum decisions, enhancing returns of those not in need of international protection and strengthening cooperation with international partners. UNHCR endorses the objective of an asylum system that is fair, efficient and sustainable, recognising that timely and accurate decision-making, combined with effective returns procedures, benefits refugees, host communities and the integrity of the system as a whole.

7. Against this background, UNHCR considers that several provisions of the Bill merit further consideration. While welcoming the Government's objectives and recognising the progress already made in addressing pressures within the asylum system, UNHCR is concerned that certain reforms may risk weakening safeguards that are fundamental to the fairness and integrity of asylum procedures and could undermine conditions that support successful integration for those ultimately recognised as refugees. In UNHCR's experience, durable and sustainable reform is most successfully achieved where efficiency is pursued alongside, and not at the expense of, procedural fairness, access to protection and successful integration. The recommendations set out below are intended both to ensure consistency with the UK's international obligations and to support the effective achievement of the Government's stated objectives.

8. More broadly, this Bill is the latest in a series of legislative reforms to the UK's asylum and immigration system. Since 2021, successive Acts of Parliament have introduced extensive changes, contributing to an increasingly complex legal framework governing asylum, refugee protection, appeals and removals. While many of these reforms have been advanced with the objective of reducing irregular arrivals and disrupting dangerous journeys across the Channel, irregular movement and dangerous crossings remain a significant challenge. This underlines the importance of measures that are not limited to legislative reform alone, but that form part of a comprehensive strategy addressing the drivers of irregular movement, expanding safe, regular pathways, strengthening international responsibility-sharing, and enhancing practical cooperation with European and other partner States.

9. UNHCR welcomes the opportunity to engage constructively with the Government and Parliament on the Bill. The observations that follow identify areas where the legislation has the potential to contribute positively to a fairer, more efficient and sustainable asylum system, while also setting out recommendations intended to strengthen the Bill, support the achievement of its stated objectives, and ensure continued consistency with the UK's obligations under the Refugee Convention and international human rights law.

DETAILED OBSERVATIONS

Contents
I. The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority … 4
II. Family Life … 18
III. Protection Status … 23
IV. The Interpretation of "lawfully staying" in respect of the Refugee Convention … 25
V. Requirement of payments from recipients of asylum support … 26

I. The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority

1. Clauses 1-16 of the Bill provide for the establishment of a body to be known as the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority (IIAA). The IIAA would assume jurisdiction for a broad range of matters currently determined by the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, including protection and human rights appeals, certain immigration bail applications, appeals against decisions depriving a person of British citizenship, and residual appeals relating to the rights of EU, EEA and Swiss citizens and their family members under the post-Brexit immigration framework.

2. As set out by the Government in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, and as previously outlined in the Restoring Order and Control policy statement, the creation of the IIAA is intended to address the significant and growing backlog within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. [8] The Government considers that fundamental reform is required to ensure an appeals system capable of responding flexibly to demand, reducing delays, supporting the timely enforcement of removals and deportations, reducing costs associated with lengthy appeal processes, and restoring public confidence in the asylum system. To this end, the Bill establishes the IIAA as a dedicated appeals body, with appeals to be determined by adjudicators appointed under the new framework rather than judges appointed by the Judicial Appointments Commission.

3. In May 2026, UNHCR shared with the Government its paper International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, [9] ("Considerations paper") setting out the international standards and core due process requirements that should inform the design and operation of the new body. In that paper, UNHCR identified a number of matters critical to the effectiveness, fairness and integrity of the new body, including in relation to access to legal representation, early legal advice and interpretation services, adjudicator recruitment and training, support for appellants with specific needs or vulnerabilities, hearing methods, case prioritisation, and accountability and oversight arrangements. UNHCR subsequently published the Considerations paper in June 2026. [10]

4. While not seeking to restate those considerations in full, the present observations consider the Government's specific proposals against the principles and safeguards identified by UNHCR for the design and operation of the new body and highlight issues that warrant further attention. Given UNHCR's international protection and statelessness mandates, the observations focus primarily on the implications of the reforms for protection appeals. However, many of the principles discussed below, including independence, procedural fairness, effective access to justice, and the availability of an effective remedy, are equally relevant to other matters that would fall within the IIAA's jurisdiction, including immigration bail proceedings, human rights appeals and appeals against deprivation of citizenship decisions.

5. The right of an asylum applicant to appeal a negative decision, including a negative admissibility decision, before an authority, court or tribunal that is separate from and independent of the authority that made the original decision, is a core due process standard in promoting the fairness and integrity of the asylum system and is critical in ensuring that the principle of non-refoulement is upheld. [11] The importance of this safeguard is underscored by the significant proportion of protection refusals overturned on appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). In the year April 2025 – March 2026, between 36% and 40% of first instance refusals or revocations of protection were overturned on appeal in each quarter. [12] These figures demonstrate the critical role of an effective and independent appeals mechanism in identifying and correcting errors in first-instance decision-making. Without meaningful independent review, there would be a substantial risk that individuals entitled to international protection would be wrongly refused and exposed to refoulement.

6. UNHCR recognises the Government's objective of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the appeals system and reducing delays in the determination of appeals. The establishment of the IIAA, with responsibility for determining appeals against immigration and asylum decisions and applications for immigration bail, is not in itself problematic, provided that it preserves an effective remedy for individuals seeking international protection whose claims have been refused at first instance. Any reform affecting the appeal and review of refugee status determination decisions must continue to ensure that these functions are exercised by a body that is sufficiently independent of first-instance decision-making and capable of providing rigorous and effective scrutiny of both findings of fact and findings of law.

7. UNHCR therefore welcomes and acknowledges the Government's stated objective that the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority should provide an effective remedy grounded in the principles of the rule of law, procedural fairness and impartiality. [13] UNHCR particularly welcomes the commitment to ensuring that individuals have effective access to the appeals mechanism and are able to navigate it effectively, and that decisions are reached objectively, on the basis of the evidence and the law, without fear or favour. [14]

8. However, having reviewed the Bill, UNHCR is concerned that aspects of the proposed framework risk falling short of these stated objectives and may undermine the quality, fairness and effectiveness of asylum appeals. Experience in other jurisdictions demonstrates that efforts to improve efficiency, when not accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards and sufficient institutional capacity, can fail to achieve their intended aims and may in some cases exacerbate existing backlogs. [15] Any weakening of procedural safeguards, or diminution in the quality, independence or expertise of adjudicators, could have serious consequences for the identification of those in need of international protection and the prevention of refoulement.

9. UNHCR notes that many key aspects of the IIAA's operation are not defined in the Bill itself but will instead be left to future regulations and procedure rules. As a result, a number of important questions regarding its structure, operation and applicable safeguards remain unanswered. These include, amongst other matters, the respective roles of legally trained senior adjudicators and lay executive adjudicators, the precise scope of the IIAA's review function, the circumstances in which appeals may be determined without an oral hearing, and the procedural safeguards that will apply in practice.

10. This lack of detail necessarily limits the extent to which the proposed system can be fully assessed at this stage. At the same time, it means that there remains an opportunity for the Government to ensure that the IIAA's final design incorporates the safeguards, expertise and oversight mechanisms necessary to support fair, effective and sustainable decision-making. Greater clarity, whether on the face of the Bill or through accompanying explanatory material, would assist Parliament in scrutinising the proposed reforms and assessing whether the new body will be capable of delivering fair, effective and sustainable appeal outcomes.

11. UNHCR also takes this opportunity to reiterate that reform of the appeals framework alone is unlikely to achieve the Government's stated objectives unless it is accompanied by sustained improvements in the quality of first-instance decision-making. While UNHCR acknowledges the steps already taken by the Home Office to strengthen initial decision-making, further progress is both necessary and achievable. UNHCR's recent audit of asylum interviews identified shortcomings in interview practice that risk undermining the quality of decisions reached at first instance. [16] The audit found that decisions are at times made on the basis of insufficient information, creating a risk both that individuals may be wrongly refused protection and that protection may be granted where the available evidence does not justify such an outcome. This underlines the importance of continued investment in high-quality interviewing, training and supervision. Ensuring that decisions are accurate, fair and well-reasoned at first instance is the most effective means of reducing unnecessary appeals, improving the efficiency of the decision-making process, and minimising pressure on appeal bodies.

Membership of the IIAA

12. Clause 2 establishes a membership structure comprising legally-qualified senior adjudicators and lay executive adjudicators. Under Clause 2(8), a senior adjudicator must have practised as a qualified lawyer for at least two years (or possess equivalent experience). By contrast, executive adjudicators appointed under Clause 2(6) are not required to hold legal qualifications or expertise in immigration or asylum matters. Two senior positions to be filled by individuals with legal experience are provided for in the Bill. Clause 2(7) requires the Professional Standards Officer and Chief Appeals Officer each to have practised as a qualified lawyer for at least five years (or possess equivalent experience).

13. The Bill appears to envisage that legally qualified members will play an important role in providing legal expertise, guidance and oversight within the IIAA. However, neither the Bill nor the accompanying memoranda specify the proportion of adjudicators who will be legally qualified, nor do they clearly set out how legal expertise will be embedded within decision-making processes or how senior adjudicators will support executive adjudicators in the exercise of their functions. The Secretary of State indicated to Parliament that legally qualified adjudicators would be in the minority: "Where specific legal expertise is required, we will have on hand a smaller cohort of legally trained adjudicators, who must have been a barrister or solicitor or have similar legal experience." [17]

14. As previously set out in UNHCR's Considerations paper, asylum appeals frequently involve complex legal and evidential issues, including the interpretation and application of international refugee law, the assessment of credibility, and the evaluation of country of origin information. [18] Individuals responsible for determining appeals should therefore possess sufficient legal knowledge and subject matter expertise to identify the relevant issues in a case, apply the correct legal standards, and ensure that procedural safeguards are respected. Such expertise promotes accurate, consistent and well-reasoned decision-making, reduces the risk of legal error, and helps to avoid unnecessary further appeals.

15. UNHCR is therefore concerned that the Bill does not require executive adjudicators, who may constitute the majority of those determining appeals, to possess any legal knowledge, any experience in the field of asylum and human rights, or any demonstrable skills in applying legal principles. While the Bill indicates that legal expertise will be provided by senior adjudicators and other legally qualified members, it remains unclear how that expertise will be integrated into day-to-day decision-making or the extent to which executive adjudicators will be supported or supervised in the exercise of their functions.

16. UNHCR notes that the Government's rationale for not requiring adjudicators to have any legal knowledge or experience is, in part, to expand the pool of eligible candidates and address capacity pressures within the appeals system. While UNHCR recognises the importance of increasing capacity and reducing delays, requirements relating to adjudicators' skills and expertise should be determined by the competencies necessary to discharge the role effectively and efficiently, rather than by recruitment challenges.

17. Lowering professional requirements in response to capacity pressures risks undermining the quality of decision-making and may ultimately prove counterproductive. As noted in UNHCR's Considerations paper, inadequately prepared adjudicators may struggle with the complex legal and evidential issues that frequently arise in asylum appeals. [19] This may increase the risk of flawed decisions, inconsistent outcomes and legal error, leading to additional reviews, appeals or other corrective processes. In turn, such outcomes risk exacerbating, rather than alleviating, delays and operational pressures within the system.

18. The need for highly skilled and professional adjudicators is underscored by persistent challenges with regard to the quality of first-instance decision-making. UNHCR's report on its audit of asylum interviewing, while welcoming strong Home Office commitment and ongoing investments to enhance the quality of interviews and decisions, identified notable shortcomings in the conduct of interviews, resulting in cases in which the material elements of the claim were not established or understood. Where deficiencies arise at first instance, adjudicators may be required not only to review the conclusions reached by the Home Office, but also to assess the adequacy of the underlying fact-finding process and establish a reliable factual basis on which to determine the appeal. This requires significant legal knowledge, subject-matter expertise and an understanding of refugee status determination procedures.

19. Experience in other jurisdictions supports the importance of ensuring that expertise remains central to the design of non-judicial appeal bodies. Both the Danish and Norwegian appeals procedures are composed of a mixture of legally-trained and lay members. In Denmark, appeals are heard by a panel composed of three members: a Chair, who is an appointed judge; a member appointed by the Minister for Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs; and a member appointed following nomination by the Council of the Danish Bar and Law Society. [20] In Norway, board leaders are qualified to serve as judges in a court of law, most case officers have a law degree, and board members, even if they do not have a legal background, are recommended by the Norwegian Association of Lawyers, the Norwegian Association of Social Scientists, County Governors and voluntary organisations. [21] These two systems rely on all members having a great deal of legal and subject-matter experience and benefit additionally from the involvement of judicially-qualified members.

20. In Australia, concerns that adjudicators lacked sufficient legal qualifications or relevant experience were among the factors cited in criticism of the former Immigration Assessment Authority and Administrative Appeals Tribunal, including concerns regarding decision-making quality and the effective management of caseloads. These concerns contributed to broader reforms that ultimately resulted in the abolition of both bodies and their replacement with a new Administrative Review Tribunal. [22] Significantly, the framework for the new body places renewed emphasis on the recruitment of members with relevant legal qualifications or specialised expertise. [23]

21. By contrast, the Bill envisages a significant role for executive adjudicators who may not possess legal qualifications or relevant asylum expertise, with little information provided on how legal expertise will be integrated into the work of the IIAA or how executive adjudicators will be supported in determining appeals involving complex legal and evidential issues. Unlike the Danish and Norwegian models, none of the positions within the IIAA, including the Professional Standards Officer and Chief Appeals Officer, will require judicial experience, and given the possibility that the majority of adjudicators will have no directly relevant experience, there is a risk that the full range of skills and expertise desirable for a well-functioning appeals body will not be present.

22. UNHCR therefore recommends that further information be provided regarding the role of legally qualified adjudicators within the IIAA and the arrangements through which legal expertise will be embedded in its decision-making processes, in order to allow for proper scrutiny of the Bill's impact. Given the significant consequences that asylum appeal decisions may have for individuals in need of international protection, it is essential that the new body is equipped with sufficient legal and subject matter expertise to ensure accurate and reliable decision-making. Efforts to increase capacity should not come at the expense of decision-making quality, as doing so risks undermining both the fairness and efficiency of the appeals system.

23. The need for institutional legal expertise is all the more pressing in light of the range of non-asylum appeals, each with their own legal complexities, which the IIAA will be required to determine. [24] Of particular relevance to UNHCR's mandate are appeals against decisions to deprive people of their British citizenship, which have the potential to render people stateless, and appeals relating to refugee family reunion. Additionally, adjudicators are to determine certain applications for bail made by those detained under immigration powers, which may include applications made by asylum seekers who are detained under inadmissibility procedures or otherwise.

Review of IIAA decisions

24. As noted in UNHCR's Considerations paper, an asylum appeals body must be independent, accountable and subject to effective oversight in order to ensure fair, accurate and reliable decision-making and to safeguard against refoulement. [25] Mechanisms for internal review and judicial scrutiny play an important role in maintaining decision-making quality, promoting consistency and ensuring that errors are identified and corrected.

25. UNHCR welcomes the guarantee contained in the Bill that decisions of the IIAA will be subject to the right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal (IAC) on the basis of an error of law (Clause 7(1)). UNHCR considers that this is the single most effective way of ensuring consistency in decision making and oversight of adjudicators. However, the effectiveness of this safeguard will depend, at least in part, on appellants being able to identify and articulate errors of law. Given ongoing concerns regarding access to legal advice and legal representation, [26] some appellants are likely to face significant difficulties in pursuing such appeals. It is therefore important that the Bill also provides effective mechanisms for internal quality assurance, oversight and error correction within the IIAA itself.

26. UNHCR notes the power granted to the IIAA to review and amend its own decisions, either on its own initiative, or on an application by a party to the proceedings (Clause 6(1)). The inclusion of a review mechanism has the potential to provide an important additional safeguard by enabling errors to be identified and corrected without the need for further appellate proceedings. This may be particularly beneficial if, despite the Government's stated aim of enabling access to early legal advice (see subsection on Legal Representation below), there are appellants who do not have legal representation at the point of needing to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Requesting a review could conceivably be a less technical and more accessible step than applying to the Upper Tribunal. However, given the limited detail provided in the Bill regarding the circumstances in which reviews may be conducted, the grounds on which reviews may be undertaken, and the procedures that will apply, it is difficult for UNHCR to assess the extent to which this mechanism will operate as an effective safeguard in practice. Greater clarity regarding the intended scope and operation of the review power would assist Parliament in assessing whether it is capable of providing meaningful oversight and effective correction of errors.

27. Clause 6(2) provides that "A review under this section must be carried out by an IIAA adjudicator." However, it is unclear whether reviews will be conducted by legally qualified senior adjudicators or lay executive adjudicators. As noted above, UNHCR considers legal expertise to be an important safeguard in ensuring the quality, consistency and reliability of asylum appeal decision-making. In the absence of further detail regarding who will exercise the review function, it is difficult to assess whether the mechanism will provide a sufficiently robust means of identifying and correcting errors in IIAA decision-making. Greater clarity on this point, whether on the face of the Bill or through accompanying explanatory material, would assist in assessing the effectiveness of the proposed review mechanism. The scope of review should also be defined. If review powers are framed too broadly, there is a risk that a significant amount of the IIAA's resources would be taken up by conducting reviews – resources that might be better spent ensuring correct adjudication in the first place. A clearly defined scope of review would lend to efficiency and consistency.

28. For all the above reasons, UNHCR recommends that more detail regarding the power of review be contained within the Bill or the accompanying memoranda in order that parliamentarians may better scrutinise the power.

Independence, Accountability and Oversight

29. As noted in UNHCR's Considerations paper, institutional independence, accountability and effective oversight are essential safeguards for ensuring fair and reliable asylum decision-making and maintaining public confidence in the appeals system. [27] The Bill contains a number of provisions intended to safeguard the independence of the IIAA, provide accountability for its performance and conduct, and ensure parliamentary scrutiny of its functions. UNHCR welcomes these objectives and the inclusion of mechanisms intended to promote both institutional independence and transparency.

30. Clause 1(6) requires: "Every Minister of the Crown must uphold the independence of the IIAA and, in particular, must not seek to influence particular decisions of the IIAA through any special access to IIAA adjudicators." UNHCR welcomes the inclusion of an express statutory duty to uphold the independence of the IIAA. However, independence encompasses not only freedom from interference in individual decisions, but also institutional arrangements that enable adjudicators and other members of the IIAA to exercise their functions impartially and without fear of adverse consequences. Given the significant role that Ministers retain elsewhere in the framework, including in relation to appointments, tenure, procedural rules and the overall operation of the system, UNHCR considers that further clarification of the safeguards intended to protect the institutional independence of the IIAA would assist Parliament in assessing whether the proposed arrangements provide an effective and independent remedy.

31. Clauses 2(1) to 2(4) provide for the Secretary of State to appoint the IIAA's Chair, Professional Standards Officer, and the first Chief Executive and Chief Appeals Officer. This represents a significant departure from the current system, under which appointments to the Immigration Asylum Chamber of the First-Tier and Upper Tribunals are made by the Judicial Appointments Commission, an executive non-departmental public body. The separation of the judicial selection process from the Government is designed to provide "greater transparency, accountability, and independence in judicial appointments". [28]

32. UNHCR notes the Government's stated commitment that decisions made by the new body should be independent of government. However, there is a risk that the proposed appointments framework may undermine that objective, or at least create a perception that independence is compromised. The need to ensure both actual and perceived independence is particularly important given that the IIAA will be sponsored by the Home Office, [29] while determining appeals against decisions made by that same department. In these circumstances, robust safeguards are necessary to maintain public confidence in the body's independence and impartially. UNHCR therefore considers that an alternative system of appointment to the IIAA, more closely reflecting the safeguards in place for judicial appointments, would better support the Government's objective of establishing a body that is, and is seen to be, independent of the Government.

33. Clause 3(6) provides for the setting and maintaining of standards to be within the remit of the Professional Standards Officer, a non-executive member of the IIAA appointed by the Secretary of State (Clause 2). While the establishment of a dedicated Professional Standards Officer is welcome, UNHCR is concerned that the Bill appears to place responsibility for standards and conduct matters within the IIAA itself. This may give rise to concerns regarding the independence of investigations into the conduct of adjudicators, as the body would in effect be responsible for overseeing matters relating to its own members and decision-making. Given the importance of maintaining public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the appeals system, particularly where the IIAA is sponsored by the governmental department in which the initial decision-making authority is located, UNHCR considers that professional standards and complaints processes should be subject to appropriate independent oversight, and overseen by a separate body.

34. UNHCR welcomes Clause 3(7), which permits the Chief Executive to make representations to the Secretary of State on matters concerning IIAA members or the administration of justice by the IIAA, and requires any such representations to be laid before Parliament. However, the Bill does not specify whether the written representations will include matters of conduct, and does not mention conduct elsewhere. UNHCR recommends that provision be made, whether in the Bill or through the IIAA's procedural framework, for the investigation and reporting of conduct complaints against adjudicators, including appropriate transparency regarding the outcome of upheld complaints.

35. Schedule 2, paragraph 11(1) requires the IIAA to send to the Secretary of State an annual report on the exercise of its functions during the year, and Schedule 2, paragraph 11(3) requires that report to be laid before Parliament. UNHCR welcomes this reporting requirement as an important mechanism for transparency and parliamentary oversight. However, UNHCR considers that Parliament would be assisted by receiving information on the quality of decisions made by IIAA adjudicators and the effectiveness of the IIAA's quality assurance arrangements. These matters fall within the responsibilities of the Chief Appeals Officer under Clause 3(3) and could provide an important basis for assessing whether the new body is delivering fair, accurate and consistent decision-making.

Hearing Methods

36. The Bill defers provisions relating to hearings to the forthcoming IIAA Procedure Rules, including provisions for when matters can be dealt with without a hearing (Schedule 3, paragraph 7). UNHCR considers that there should be a strong presumption in favour of oral appeal hearings for protection claims. [30] This is particularly important where the negative decision was based on credibility findings that were not adequately addressed during the interview. [31] An appeal hearing provides an appellant not only with an opportunity to present and be questioned about any new evidence, or evidence of a change in circumstances, [32] but also to remedy any procedural issues arising from the Home Office's asylum interview. A hearing is particularly important in protection appeals given the risk of refoulement if the IIAA does not reach the correct decision and having regard to the existing shortcomings in the quality of first-instance decision making. For these reasons, UNHCR encourages the Government to provide reassurance that all protection appeals will be heard at an oral hearing, unless the appellant provides informed consent to the waiving of this requirement.

37. Paragraph 8 of Schedule 3 states that the Procedure Rules "may make provision for proceedings to take place […] at the request of one party even though the other, or another, party has had no notice." While UNHCR recognises that procedural flexibility may assist the efficient management of cases, it is essential that appellants are afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in proceedings that may determine their entitlement to international protection. It is critical that appellants receive adequate notice of hearings and sufficient opportunity to prepare and present their case.

Case acceleration and prioritisation

38. Clause 9 establishes a mechanism through which the Secretary of State may request that appeals or bail proceedings before the IIAA be expedited where she considers that doing so would be in the public interest. The Secretary of State may request that the IIAA determine an appeal or bail application, or take specified procedural steps, by a particular date. Under Clause 9(3), the IIAA must comply with such a request unless it would not be reasonably practicable to do so or compliance would not be in the interests of justice. Clause 9(4) provides that further details of the expedition process will be set out in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

39. As previously noted in UNHCR's Considerations paper, accelerated procedures may play a legitimate role in managing caseloads and reducing delays within asylum systems. [33] However, any acceleration of asylum appeals must be accompanied by robust procedural safeguards and due process guarantees. Given the serious risk of refoulement arising from an incorrect decision, it is essential that the IIAA provides appellants a reasonable time to prepare their appeal, retains discretion to grant extensions or adjournments where required in the interests of justice, and ensures that any accelerated procedures do not curtail procedural rights or disadvantage unrepresented or vulnerable appellants.

40. UNHCR recognises the Government's objective of reducing delays in the determination of appeals. However, the Bill provides limited detail regarding the circumstances in which expedition requests may be made, the extent to which cases may be accelerated, or the safeguards that will apply where proceedings are expedited. Much of the practical operation of the power will therefore depend upon the content of future regulations.

41. In UNHCR's view, the regulations made under the power granted by Clause 9 should ensure that expedited procedures do not curtail procedural rights or disadvantage appellants who require additional time to prepare their appeal. In particular, expedited timeframes should not prevent appellants from obtaining legal advice, securing relevant evidence, responding to issues raised by the Secretary of State, or otherwise presenting their case effectively. It is also important that the IIAA retains sufficient flexibility to grant extensions or adjournments where necessary in the interests of justice, particularly in cases involving vulnerable appellants or complex protection claims.

42. As highlighted in UNHCR's Considerations paper, prioritisation mechanisms should also be capable of accommodating cases in which expedition is necessary for protection reasons, including appeals involving children and other individuals with particular needs. [34] Given that many aspects of the expedited process will be left to future regulations, UNHCR encourages the Government to ensure that the final framework incorporates safeguards that promote both procedural fairness and the timely resolution of appeals.

Late Claims, Credibility and Procedural Fairness

43. Clauses 11 and 12 introduce a new process intended to address the late disclosure of protection and other grounds for resisting removal. Clause 11 introduces the concept of "claim notices", which requires a person liable to removal or deportation to state, within a specified period of time, all the reasons why they should not be removed from the UK. Clause 12 establishes a "late claims process" which applies in appeals of those who have not provided those reasons by the specified date.

44. UNHCR recognises that governments have a legitimate interest in addressing the issue of late submission of asylum claims being used to frustrate the removal process. Timely returns of people who are not in need of international protection and do not have any other grounds for remaining are an important component of a well-functioning asylum system and contribute to maintaining public confidence in the integrity of that system. [35] Demonstrating that misuse of the asylum system cannot function as a back-door alternative to regular migration also serves as a strategy to deter irregular migration and to reduce incentives for human smuggling and trafficking. [36]

45. However, UNHCR cautions against measures which would curtail procedural rights in a manner that has the potential to be punitive of individuals with legitimate claims. UNHCR reiterates that there are many valid reasons for a delay in disclosing information. Refugees, asylum-seekers and victims of trafficking may be suffering the symptoms of trauma and other mental health problems associated with their experiences; feel disoriented by the new environment of the country of asylum; feel anxious, desperate, or frightened; lack trust in the authorities; or experience feelings of shame. Timely disclosure may also depend on access to good-quality legal advice, the training and competencies of interviewers or interpreters, the timescales of any initial procedure, or circumstances in the applicant's country. [37]

46. Clause 11(7) provides that, where a person provides information or evidence after the deadline given in a claim notice, they must provide a statement setting out their reasons for doing so. Paragraphs 11(2) and (3) of Schedule 3 require the Procedure Rules to make provision for an IIAA adjudicator to take account, as damaging to the credibility of the appellant, of the late provision of evidence, unless there are good reasons for the late submission.

47. UNHCR considers that, where there is no good reason for the delay, the late disclosure of information relating to the claim may properly be taken into account when assessing credibility. However, the late submission of evidence supporting facts or assertions that have already been disclosed cannot reasonably be said, on its own, to have an overall negative impact on credibility. Evidence which supports an assertion which was made in good time (or made late but for a good reason) is not inherently damaging to the credibility of that assertion merely because that evidence was provided late without good reason. It may be fair to consider whether the weight to be afforded to the evidence itself should be diminished if it is provided late for no good reason. However, the appellant's credibility must still be assessed with regard to all the evidence in the round. It would be wrong to require an appellant's credibility to be negatively impacted, solely because evidence that is clearly reliable and persuasive was nonetheless provided late without good reason. Such a requirement could result in appellants electing not to submit vital evidence for fear of their credibility being damaged.

48. UNHCR reiterates that it is important that credibility be assessed in the round, taking into account all of a person's individual and contextual circumstances. [38] This encompasses the personal background of the applicant – their age, nationality, ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation and/or gender identity, education, social status, religion, and cultural background; his or her past and present experiences of ill-treatment, torture, persecution, harm, or other serious human rights violations; and the relevant situation in the country of origin or other relevant country. [39]

49. Paragraph 11(4) of Schedule 3 goes further and provides that the Procedure Rules may make provision for an IIAA adjudicator to take account, as damaging the credibility of an appellant, of any other failure to comply with a requirement imposed on them by or under the Rules. No allowance is made for circumstances in which a requirement was not complied with for good reason. Such a widely-defined provision risks the creation of a rule treating as damaging to credibility omissions which have no bearing on the merits of the appeal. This risks elevating procedural compliance above the assessment of protection needs and may result in credibility findings being influenced by factors unrelated to whether an appellant faces a risk of persecution or serious harm.

50. UNHCR therefore considers that paragraph 11(4) should be amended to ensure that adverse credibility findings may be drawn only from conduct that is genuinely relevant to the assessment of credibility and only after consideration of any explanation provided by the appellant. This would be more consistent with established principles governing credibility assessment in asylum procedures and would better support the accurate identification of individuals in need of international protection.

Legal Representation

51. Paragraph 9 of Schedule 3 requires appellants to inform the IIAA at the outset of proceedings whether they have received legal advice in relation to their appeal, whether they wish to obtain such advice, and, where they have been unable to obtain advice, the reasons for this and any steps taken to secure it.

52. UNHCR welcomes this provision and the apparent recognition within the Bill that access to legal advice is an important component of a fair and effective appeals process. However, while paragraph 9 may assist in identifying appellants who have unmet legal needs, the Bill does not specify what steps the IIAA will take where an appellant has been unable to obtain legal advice despite wishing to do so. Further information would therefore assist Parliament in understanding how this provision fits within the Government's wider commitment to improving access to legal advice and representation.

53. As set out in its Considerations paper, UNHCR considers that access to quality legal advice and representation is one of the most important safeguards for ensuring that asylum appeals are determined fairly, accurately and efficiently. [40] Legal representatives play a critical role in identifying relevant evidence, articulating legal arguments, ensuring procedural requirements are met, and assisting appellants, particularly those with vulnerabilities or complex protection claims, to participate effectively in proceedings. [41] For these reasons, UNHCR continues to recommend that all appellants before the IIAA should have access to early legal advice and ongoing legal representation.

54. The importance of legal representation is underscored by continuing difficulties in accessing immigration and asylum advice. A 2025 report by Dr. Jo Wilding of the University of Sussex found that at least 57% of main applicants (excluding dependants) claiming asylum or appealing a refusal in the First-tier Tribunal were unable to access a legal aid representative. [42] This figure is largely in keeping with UNHCR's own observations. In UNHCR's review of 60 asylum interviews from 2024 and 2025, 32 applicants had legal representatives registered as acting on the Home Office's database, though not all of those representatives held a Law Society quality mark for Immigration and Asylum or an Immigration Advice Authority accreditation of the necessary level to provide full representation at application stage. Of those who had a legal representative, a significant number appeared to have received minimal assistance from them. A July 2026 report of the House of Commons Justice Committee concluded that legal aid service provision is insufficient and that recent targeted increases in immigration and housing fees are unlikely to appreciably increase provision. [43]

55. Quality legal representation is essential for those seeking to appeal a refusal of protection status. This will become even more so if adjudicators hearing appeals are not themselves legally qualified and if the clauses in the Bill providing for credibility to be treated as damaged where directions of the IIAA are not complied with or when deadlines are missed are enacted.

56. UNHCR therefore welcomes the Home Secretary's statement that early legal advice will form a core component of the Government's wider programme of asylum and appeals reform [44] and her letter to the Chair of the House of Commons Justice Committee confirming that such early legal advice would "ensure all matters relevant to a claim are properly considered". [45] It would be important that further detail is provided regarding how that commitment will be implemented in practice, including the scope of any advice provided and whether appellants will have access to ongoing legal representation where this is necessary to ensure the fair determination of their appeals. While one-off advice may be of some benefit to individuals, what most appellants require in order to navigate the appeals process is legal representation.

II. Family Life

57. Clause 18 of the Bill seeks to codify aspects of the interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in immigration cases, including by defining the circumstances in which family life will normally be considered to exist. The clause provides that family life will ordinarily be limited to a person's "core cohabiting family". UNHCR has a particular interest in these provisions insofar as they may affect the ability of refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection to reunite with family members and enjoy family life in the UK.

58. The principle of family unity is a fundamental component of international refugee protection. [46] Because of the very nature of being a refugee or otherwise in need of international protection, it cannot reasonably be expected that family members will be able to enjoy family life together in their country of origin. States should therefore allow and facilitate family reunification for refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection. [47]

59. Until recently, the UK operated a Refugee Family Reunion policy whereby pre-flight partners and minor children, in instances where the familial relationship still subsisted, could join the refugee in the UK as of right. However, Refugee Family Reunion has been paused in the UK since September 2025 and, in the interim, refugees are directed to apply under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules, the pathway previously applicable only to those settled in the UK or British citizens who wish to bring a family member to the UK.

60. In the Home Secretary's Restoring Order and Control statement, the Government indicated that a future refugee family reunion scheme may be subject to "[t]he same conditions […] as […] other legal migrants and UK citizens", [48] suggesting that the income [49] and language requirements which apply under Appendix FM might also be applied to refugees. [50]

61. As set out in UNHCR's observations on the Restoring Order and Control policy statement, UNHCR is concerned by the suggestion that refugees may in future be required to meet the same family reunification requirements as migrants. Refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection should benefit from a more favourable family reunification regime than migrants. [51] Unlike migrants, refugees cannot reasonably be expected to return to their country of origin in order to enjoy family life with their family members. They also frequently face particular obstacles to satisfying income, accommodation and language requirements, including disrupted education and employment histories, difficulties accessing the labour market, trauma arising from persecution or displacement, prolonged family separation, and the broader practical consequences of forced displacement. [52] The application of the same requirements that apply to migrants therefore risks making family reunification disproportionately difficult, and in some cases impossible in practice, for refugees and their family members. For these reasons, UNHCR's position, supported by caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), is that refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection should generally be exempt from such requirements or, at a minimum, benefit from greater flexibility and less stringent conditions when seeking reunification with family members. [53] This is particularly the case when children are involved and/or the concerned family members have other protection needs. [54]

62. If refugee family reunion becomes subject to more restrictive requirements, Article 8 ECHR is likely to assume greater practical significance for refugee families seeking to reunite in the UK. Refugees and their family members who are unable to meet any revised family reunion requirements, such as income or language requirements, may need to rely on Article 8 ECHR to establish their right to family life and seek reunification. UNHCR is therefore concerned that the limitations on the interpretation of Article 8 ECHR proposed in the Bill could further restrict an important avenue through which refugee families may seek to preserve family unity.

63. Clause 18(4) would insert into Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (which relates to the application of Article 8 of the ECHR) a section 117AA, which would include the stipulation at 117AA(1) that "[a] person's family life for the purposes of Article 8 is normally limited to their core cohabiting family" (emphasis added). Neither the Bill nor any of the accompanying memoranda indicate whether cohabiting refers only to the present time, or whether it includes what the previous situation was or what the case would be if separated family members were reunited in the UK. While the provision provides room for exceptions through the use of the term "normally", it creates a presumption that family life will not ordinarily exist in the absence of cohabitation.

64. UNHCR recalls that the existence of a family is a question of fact and involves examination of real and close personal ties. [55] UNHCR's 2024 Guidelines on International Legal Standards Relating to Family Reunification for Refugees and Other Beneficiaries of International Protection emphasise that there is no single, universally applicable definition of the family in international law. What constitutes a family must be determined on a case-by-case basis, adopting an open, flexible approach and broad interpretation, [56] considering biological and personal ties, cultural variations as well as material, health-related, emotional or economic dependency factors. [57] The ECtHR has found that, for the purposes of Article 8, family life is normally limited to the core family; [58] however, it has consistently emphasised that the existence of family life is a question of fact, depending on the real existence in practice of close personal ties, and must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances of each case. [59]

65. While cohabitation is a relevant consideration in assessing whether family life exists, particularly in the context of relationships between adults, other factors are relevant to determining whether a relationship amounts to family life. [60] The proposed clause risks placing undue weight on living arrangements rather than on the reality of the relationship and the existence of real and close personal ties.

66. Particular concern arises in relation to parent-child relationships. Children form part of the family unit from birth and, where parents separate or divorce, both parents ordinarily maintain a family relationship with the child, and the child with both parents. [61] The existence of family life in the case of children and their parents is therefore not dependent upon cohabitation, but upon the continuing reality of the relationship and the existence of real and close personal ties. This understanding is reflected in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which has consistently recognised that family life exists between a parent and child from birth and ordinarily continues notwithstanding separation, divorce, or the fact that the parent and child do not live together. [62] Family life will generally continue to exist between a child and a non-cohabiting parent unless exceptional circumstances arise that rupture the relationship.

67. Proposed section 117AA(3), which provides that a parent who does not live with their child does not normally have family life with that child unless there is evidence of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship, risks reversing the ordinary starting point established in the case law. While the nature and quality of the parent-child relationship will always be relevant, the absence of cohabitation should not alter the ordinary starting point that family life continues to exist between a child and their parent. As the ECtHR observed in Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands, a child forms part of the family unit from birth and there exists a bond amounting to family life between parent and child regardless of the extent of day-to-day care or upbringing provided by the parent concerned. [63]

68. Family life between a parent and child ordinarily exists irrespective of whether they live together. This is particularly important in the refugee context, where family separation is often the direct consequence of persecution, conflict or displacement. Consistent with established domestic and ECtHR jurisprudence, as well as international standards on family reunification, the starting point should be that family life between a parent and child ordinarily persists notwithstanding separation, divorce or periods of non-cohabitation. UNHCR therefore recommends that proposed section 117AA(3) be deleted and that sections 117AA(1) and (2) be amended to remove the presumption that family life between a parent and child depends upon cohabitation.

69. In relation to spouses or partners, UNHCR recognises that cohabitation may ordinarily be an important indicator of family life. [64] However, proposed sections 117AA(2)(a) and 117AA(4) appear to proceed on the basis that partners who do not live together will not normally enjoy family life for the purposes of Article 8. UNHCR is concerned that this approach does not adequately account for situations in which partners would ordinarily be living together but are currently unable to.

70. As reflected in UNHCR's 2024 Guidelines on Family Reunification, family life may exist between spouses and partners irrespective of whether they are cohabiting. While cohabitation, the length of the relationship and evidence of commitment to one another may all be relevant considerations, the absence of cohabitation does not exclude the existence of family life. [65] Indeed, its absence ought not create a presumption against family life. [66] This is of particular importance in the refugee context, where partners may be unable to live together as a consequence of persecution, armed conflict, violence, or circumstances relating to the need for international protection. In such circumstances, non-cohabitation is not indicative of an absence of family life, but rather reflects the realities of forced separation, notwithstanding subsisting genuine and close personal ties.

71. This understanding is reflected in recent case law concerning refugee family reunification. Courts have recognised that periods of separation resulting from a family member's refugee status cannot, without more, justify a finding that no real family relationship exists. They have further recognised that regular contact, efforts to maintain personal and emotional ties, and the intention to preserve or re-establish family life may be sufficient to demonstrate the continuing existence of a real family relationship notwithstanding prolonged physical separation. [67]

72. The implications of a presumption that cohabitation is required are likely not limited to refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection. There may be a range of circumstances in which partners are unable to live together despite maintaining genuine and close personal ties. While the presumption may therefore raise broader issues beyond the refugee context, UNHCR's concern arises most directly in situations where separation is the consequence of persecution, conflict, violence, or other circumstances connected to the need for international protection.

73. UNHCR therefore recommends, at a minimum, that the Bill be amended to make express provision for situations in which partners would ordinarily be living together but are prevented from doing so by circumstances connected to the need for international protection. In such cases, the existence of family life should be assessed looking first at the reality of the relationship and the existence of genuine and close personal ties, rather than by taking living arrangements as a starting point.

74. Such an amendment would better reflect the realities of refugee family life, in which prolonged separation is frequently involuntary and arises directly from the circumstances giving rise to the need for international protection.

III. Protection Status

75. Clause 21 of the bill gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to the effect that people whose removal would either (i) breach the UK's obligations under the Refugee Convention, or (ii) breach the UK's obligations in relation to people eligible for subsidiary (humanitarian) protection, are each to be granted a single form of status known as "protection status", rather than refugee status or humanitarian protection respectively. These provisions give effect to the Government's wider proposal to replace the existing system of refugee status and humanitarian protection with a single "protection status" as part of its new "core protection" model. The Government's explanatory material describes the purpose of Part 3 as replacing "asylum/refugee and humanitarian protection claims and grants of leave with a single "core protection' model". [68] The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill further describes the reform as marking a shift "away from an assumption of offering permanent protection, and towards a more basic, and temporary protection", reducing permission to stay from 5 years to 30 months. [69]

76. UNHCR has previously shared concerns regarding aspects of the proposed core protection model in its Observations on 'Restoring Order and Control' Asylum Policy Statement. [70] These are set out in paragraphs 12 to 19 of that document, which should be read alongside these observations on the Bill.

77. The proposal to create a single form of "protection status", thus merging refugee status and humanitarian protection, is not inherently problematic. The Refugee Convention does not prescribe the form of leave to enter or remain that must be granted to refugees. Rather, what is important is that individuals who meet the refugee definition are explicitly recognised as refugees and enjoy the rights and protections to which they are entitled under the Refugee Convention. Nor is it inherently problematic that refugees be granted the same status under domestic law as others who are not Convention refugees but are in need of and entitled to other – complementary – forms of international protection on humanitarian grounds. However, it is vital that the creation of a single form of protection does not obscure the fact that an individual has been recognised as a refugee. UNHCR therefore recommends that the Bill specifies that the Home Secretary must notify individuals in writing of the basis on which protection status is granted.

78. Given that the protections and entitlements which would be enjoyed by the beneficiaries of the new single form of "protection status" are to be contained in the forthcoming regulations (which must be made within one year of the section coming into force as per Clause 21(5)), it is not possible to ascertain from the Bill whether the status afforded those who would currently receive refugee status or humanitarian protection would change qualitatively.

79. UNHCR would therefore welcome assurance that the rights of people granted "protection status" on the basis of the Refugee Convention will not be diminished in comparison with those currently attached to refugee status by forthcoming regulations.

80. The Home Secretary has stated that a right of appeal will be available only to those refused protection, and not to those who are granted protection but disagree with the basis upon which it has been granted. [71] This would include, for example, a person who has been granted protection status on humanitarian grounds but considers that they should have been recognised as a refugee under the Refugee Convention. In principle, the absence of such a right of appeal may be unproblematic if individuals granted protection status on the basis of the Refugee Convention and humanitarian protection grounds enjoy materially identical rights, entitlements and procedural safeguards. However, Clause 21(3)(e) provides that the Regulations may "make different provision in relation to—(i) protection status granted, and protection claims made, on the Convention ground, and (ii) protection status granted, and protection claims made, on the humanitarian protection ground."

81. It is therefore possible that there will continue to be a difference in the rights, entitlements and safeguards afforded to protection status holders based on the ground for granting them such status. If meaningful differences remain between the two groups, an erroneous decision that a person qualifies for protection status only on the humanitarian protection ground rather than as a refugee could have significant consequences for the individual concerned. In these circumstances, UNHCR considers that the only way to operationalise the single form of status, while remaining compliant with international standards, would be to ensure that all beneficiaries of protection status receive the rights afforded under the Refugee Convention, including application of the relevant procedure and criteria for cancelling, ceasing and revoking protection status.

82. Importantly, however, where a person is wrongly granted protection on humanitarian grounds rather than Refugee Convention grounds, the absence of a right of appeal may have significant consequences at a later stage. If the findings of fact and law underpinning the original decision cannot be challenged, they may continue to be relied upon in any subsequent decision to cease, cancel or revoke protection status. In those circumstances, it would not be sufficient to allow the individual merely to argue that they still require protection despite the original finding that they were not a refugee. This is because a person who faces a risk for reasons specific to their individual circumstances, rather than because of a generalised risk in their country of origin, may remain in need of protection even where the overall country situation has improved.

83. UNHCR therefore considers that, where no right of appeal exists against the original protection decision, the Bill should provide an opportunity, when cessation, cancellation or revocation of status is being considered, for the individual to argue that they should have been recognised as a refugee under the Refugee Convention, rather than granted humanitarian protection, at the time of the original decision. Any appeal against a decision to cease, cancel or revoke protection status should also permit a challenge to the original findings of fact and law, without prejudice arising from the passage of time. Given the importance of this safeguard, UNHCR considers that it should be included on the face of the Bill rather than left to regulations.

IV. The Interpretation of "lawfully staying" in respect of the Refugee Convention

84. Clause 22 would amend the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 so as to define circumstances under which refugees granted protection status would not be "lawfully staying" in the UK for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.

85. These circumstances would be that the refugee in question is a danger to the security of the UK, or, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, the refugee constitutes a danger to the community of the UK, in line with Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention. [72]

86. Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention permits an exception to the principle of non-refoulement in Article 33(1) where there are reasonable grounds for regarding a refugee as a danger to the security of the country in which they are present or where, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, they constitute a danger to the community of that country. The effect of Article 33(2) is that the Refugee Convention's protection against refoulement will not apply and will not prohibit the refugee being returned to their country of origin. [73] A decision to return a refugee under Article 33(2) does not, of itself, terminate refugee status. Accordingly, for as long as the individual remains in the territory of the host State, they remain a refugee and continue to be entitled to those rights and benefits under the 1951 Convention that are applicable to refugees by virtue of their presence in the territory. [74]

87. The proposed provision conflates two distinct concepts within the Refugee Convention: whether a refugee falls within the exception to non-refoulement contained in Article 33(2), and whether that refugee is "lawfully staying" in the territory of a Contracting State. While a finding within the meaning of Article 33(2) that a refugee constitutes a danger to national security or, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community may give rise to removal proceedings, it does not, in itself, determine whether they are lawfully staying for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Particularly where removal is not possible, including because of other applicable non-refoulement obligations under international human rights law, a refugee may remain authorised to stay in the UK under domestic law. At a minimum, such a person would remain "lawfully present" in the UK for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Accordingly, they would continue to be entitled to those rights and standards of treatment under the Refugee Convention that are contingent upon "lawful presence" in the territory. Whether they also remain "lawfully staying" is likely to depend on the nature of the leave granted and the extent to which it provides a sufficiently stable and durable basis for residence. UNHCR therefore encourages the Government to reconsider this provision.

V. Requirement of payments from recipients of asylum support

88. Clauses 23 and 24 would introduce a new requirement for certain individuals who have received asylum support while awaiting a decision on their claim to make a financial contribution towards the cost of that support once their claim has been determined. According to the Government, the purpose of these provisions is to reduce the financial burden that the asylum support system places on taxpayers and to require those who are able to do so to contribute towards the costs incurred on their behalf. [75] While the detailed operation of the scheme is to be set out in regulations, the Home Office has indicated that it intends to require a flat-rate payment of approximately £10,000 as a contribution towards the overall cost of accommodation and subsistence support received. [76] Clause 24(1)-(3) further provides that the amount payable may take account of support provided for dependents, meaning that individuals who received support for family members may be required to make a larger contribution. It also requires that the regulations which will govern the operation of the repayment system must ensure that repayments are not sought where doing so would render a person destitute, while providing that any sums that remain unpaid may be recovered as a debt due to the Secretary of State.

89. In the UK, asylum support plays a vital role in ensuring that asylum-seekers are able to meet their essential living needs while their claims are being examined. The provision of accommodation and subsistence support helps to prevent destitution, enables applicants to engage effectively with the asylum process, and reflects the reality that asylum-seekers are generally not permitted to support themselves through employment while awaiting a decision on their claim. [77] Unlike forms of assistance that are voluntarily accessed and generally repayable, such as student loans, asylum support is not ordinarily received as a matter of choice. Individuals who require support are generally not permitted to work, have limited ability to influence the length of time for which support is needed (which may span initial decision making and subsequent appeal procedures), and have little or no control over the accommodation and support arrangements made on their behalf.

90. UNHCR recognises the considerable support provided by the UK to asylum-seekers through accommodation and assistance with living costs, as well as the significant public expenditure associated with these arrangements. While the Government has a legitimate interest in reducing the costs of the asylum system, UNHCR is concerned that, insofar as they relate to recognised refugees, the payments envisaged in the Bill are not in accordance with the Refugee Convention. UNHCR therefore encourages the Government to pursue the objective of reducing asylum support costs through other measures, including improving the speed and quality of asylum decision-making, without compromising compliance with the Refugee Convention.

91. Article 29(1) of the Refugee Convention requires that states "shall not impose upon refugees duties, charges or taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or may be levied on their nationals in similar situations." This provision does not allow for any exceptions. [78]

92. While the payment which the Government proposes to impose is described as a "contribution" toward the cost of support provided to them rather than a duty, tax or charge, this does not remove it from the scope of Article 29(1) of the Refugee Convention. Article 29(1) is drafted in very broad terms, covering "duties, charges or taxes, of any description whatsoever" (emphasis added). Zimmerman, Einarsen and Herrmann state that this wording "intends to incorporate all kinds of financial obligations levied on the refugee by the State, the municipality, or any other authority." [79] Robinson asserts that the expression "must refer to every kind of public assessment, be it of a general nature (taxes and duties) or for specific services rendered by the authorities to a given person (charges). [80] Hathaway considers there is support for such an understanding of Article 29(1). [81] Accordingly, UNHCR's view is that characterising the payment as a "contribution" does not remove it from the scope of Article 29(1).

93. The proposed repayment obligation would require refugees to bear a financial burden that is not imposed on UK nationals in comparable circumstances. Although British nationals do not receive asylum support as such, asylum support fulfils the same essential function as the assistance provided to nationals through homelessness and social welfare schemes: namely, preventing destitution and ensuring access to basic accommodation and subsistence. The relevant comparison under Article 29 is therefore the nature and purpose of the support provided, rather than the statutory scheme through which it is delivered. While UK nationals are not required to repay the costs of such support once their circumstances improve, refugees would be subject to a specific obligation to reimburse the State after being granted protection status. This constitutes a charge imposed on refugees that is both additional to and more onerous than that imposed on nationals in a similar situation, contrary to Article 29(1).

94. The fact that the costs were incurred before a refugee was formally recognised as such by the UK does not alter this conclusion. Refugee status is declaratory, meaning that a person is a refugee from the moment they satisfy the criteria in the refugee definition, rather than from the point at which that status is formally recognised. [82] Article 29, unlike some other provisions of the Refugee Convention, requires only that a refugee be present in the territory of a Contracting State in order to benefit from its protection. It does not require that the refugee be "lawfully staying" in the State. [83] Accordingly, Article 29 protects refugees in respect of charges imposed in connection with support received prior to formal recognition of their status.

95. Additionally, Article 34 of the Refugee Convention requires that Contracting States "shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees". The concept of "assimilation" is to be understood in more current language as "local integration". [84] The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme ("ExCom") has recognised that the "ultimate goal of international protection is to achieve durable solutions for refugees […] through its provisions on cessation, integration and naturalisation' and 'calls on States to facilitate, as appropriate, the integration of refugees, including, as far as possible, through facilitating their naturalization." [85]

96. Article 34 of the Refugee Convention uses the word "shall", which is mandatory in nature and not only a recommendation, and thus obliges States to facilitate the integration of refugees. The extent of this obligation is far-reaching, being "as far as possible. [86]

97. Requiring refugees to repay the costs of asylum support after being granted protection status risks undermining the purpose of the support regime and adversely affecting integration outcomes. Access to asylum support is already restricted to individuals who are destitute or at risk of destitution and who lack the resources necessary to meet their essential living needs. Those who receive support have therefore already been assessed as being unable to support themselves during the asylum process. Imposing a substantial repayment obligation at the point when refugees are seeking to establish themselves in the UK is likely to impede their ability to achieve financial stability, independence and self-sufficiency, contrary to the objective of facilitating integration reflected in Article 34.

98. Newly recognised refugees commonly face significant financial pressures as they transition from asylum support to independent living. Many must meet one-off costs associated with securing accommodation, purchasing essential household goods, accessing education or training, and entering the labour market. [87] Refugee integration loans are available to assist with some of these costs, although repayments become due shortly after the loan is received. [88] Against that background, requiring refugees to make an additional contribution towards the costs of asylum support may create a significant debt burden at the very point when they are seeking to establish themselves in the UK. This is likely to make the practical challenges of integration more difficult to overcome and risks undermining, rather than supporting, successful integration.

99. Further, whilst not contained within the Bill, UNHCR is concerned by the Government's announcement that "[m]igrants will be required to pay off the full amount before being eligible for settlement". In practice, this may substantially delay access to settlement for some refugees and, in certain cases, indefinitely. Such an outcome would risk impeding refugee integration and may be inconsistent with the objective reflected in Article 34 of the Refugee Convention that States shall, as far as possible, facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees.

100. The imposition of a repayment obligation may also delay family reunification for refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection, thereby undermining the State's obligation to ensure the right to family life and the principle of family unity. Requiring refugees to repay the costs of asylum support may reduce the financial resources available to meet any costs incurring from family reunification procedures. Such delays are of particular concern given the well-documented impact of prolonged family separation on refugees' mental health and well-being. [89] Reuniting with family members who remained behind is one of the most pressing concerns of refugees and others who have been granted international protection and aids successful integration. [90] Given the important role that family reunification plays in supporting refugees' well-being, self-reliance and successful integration, measures that delay reunification may hinder, rather than support, integration outcomes. [91]

101. Notwithstanding UNHCR's principal concern that the repayment scheme is incompatible with Article 29 of the Refugee Convention, UNHCR is concerned that the safeguard contained in the Bill at Clause 23(5) is inadequate. This Clause mandates that repayments will not be due if they result in a person becoming destitute. However, as drafted, a refugee may still be required to repay asylum support costs while living substantially below the UK's recognised poverty threshold.

102. Destitution as defined by section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 is an excessively low threshold. It is the level at which a person "does not have adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it or […] cannot meet [their] other essential living needs". [92] Home Office guidance on assessing destitution for the purposes of section 95 support states that a person with adequate accommodation will generally only be regarded as destitute where their available income falls below twice the weekly asylum support allowance. [93] Based on the current support rate of £49.18 [94] this equates to £98.36 per week.

103. By way of comparison, the UK relative low income threshold (commonly referred to as the "poverty line") was £217 per week for a single adult in 2024/25, after housing costs. [95] The Bill therefore permits repayment obligations to be imposed on refugees whose incomes remain substantially below the poverty line. In UNHCR's view, a safeguard that protects only those refugees at risk of destitution, rather than poverty or financial hardship more broadly, risks undermining the Government's stated objective of enabling refugees to "integrate more fully into the communities providing them sanctuary." [96]

UNHCR, August 2026

[1] The Bill, as introduced to the House of Commons, is available here.

[2] See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 428(V), Annex, UN Doc. A/1775, para. 1. As set forth in its Statute, UNHCR fulfils its international protection mandate by, inter alia, "[p]romoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amendments thereto." Ibid., para. 8(a).

[3] UNHCR's supervisory responsibility is also reflected in Article 35 of the Refugee Convention and Article II of the 1967 Protocol, obliging State Parties to cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions, including in particular, to facilitate UNHCR's duty of supervising the application of these instruments. See: UNHCR, The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, December 2010.

[4] UNGA, Resolution A/RES/50/152 of 9 February 1996, which also specifically requested UNHCR "to provide technical and advisory services pertaining to the preparation and implementation of nationality legislation to interested States". See also: UNGA, Resolution A/RES/61/137 of 25 January 2007; UNGA, Resolution A/RES/62/124 of 24 January 2008; and UNGA, Resolution A/RES/63/148 of 27 January 2009. UNHCR's role has been recognized by the UK Supreme Court in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015], UKSC 19, para. 22.

[5] UNGA, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 28 September 1954, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 360, p. 117. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 989, p. 175. See also: UNHCR, Executive Committee (ExCom), 'Conclusion on Identification, Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons No. 106 (LVII)', 6 October 2006, paras (i) and (j), available in: UNHCR, Conclusions on International Protection Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme 1975 – 2017 (Conclusions No. 1 – 114), HCR/IP/3/Eng/REV.2017, October 2017.

[6] UNHCR, Observations on "Restoring Order and Control": A Statement on the Government's Asylum and Returns Policy, February 2025.

[7] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026.

[8] Explanatory Notes to the Immigration and Asylum Bill, p. 7.

[9] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026.

[10] Ibid.

[11] UNHCR and Inter-Parliamentary Union, A Guide to International Refugee Protection and Building State Asylum Systems, Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 27, 2017, p. 179. See also: Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme (ExCom), Conclusion No. 8 (XXVIII): Determination of Refugee Status - Adopted by the Executive Committee (1977), No. 8 (XXVIII) 1977, 12 October 1977.

[12] Ministry of Justice, Tribunals statistics quarterly: January to March 2026, Main Tables (January to March 2026), tab. FIA_3.

[13] Home Office, The New Independent Appeals Body: Call for Evidence, 20 April 2026.

[14] Ibid.

[15] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026.

[16] UNHCR, Asylum Interviews in the UK: Audit Findings and Recommendations.

[17] Hansard, Immigration and Asylum Bill, Volume 789, debated on 13 July 2026, Column 672.

[18] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026, para. 29. Similarly, the other immigration and nationality appeals the IIAA will hear are of a legally complex nature.

[19] Ibid, para. 31.

[20] Flygtningenævnet, General information regarding the Danish Refugee Appeals Board.

[21] Utlendingsnemnda, This is the Immigration Appeals Board, January 2025. Utlendingsnemnda, How is UNE Organised?, April 2026.

[22] See, for example: Parliament of Australia Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Inquiry into the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2023 and the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No.1) Bill 2023, Chapter 1 – Introduction, and submissions received by the Committee here.

[23] Australian Administrative Review Tribunal, Our role.

[24] Clause 1(2) provides: "The primary function of the IIAA is to decide — (a) appeals against decisions of the Secretary of State relating to protection claims and human rights claims (see Part 5 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002), (b) certain applications for immigration bail (see Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016), (c) appeals against decisions of the Secretary of State relating to deprivation of citizenship (see section 40A of the British Nationality Act 1981), (d) appeals against decisions of the Secretary of State under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (S.I. 2016/1052) as they continue to have effect following their revocation, and (e) appeals under the Immigration (Citizens' Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/61)."

[25] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026, paras 67-70.

[26] Wilding, J, No Access to Justice 2, 2025.

[27] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026, paras 67-70.

[28] Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Judicial Appointments Commission.

[29] Explanatory Notes to the Immigration and Asylum Bill, p. 23.

[30] UNHCR, Procedural Standards for RSD under UNHCR's Mandate, 2020, p. 274.

[31] Ibid, p. 274.

[32] UNHCR and Inter-Parliamentary Union, A Guide to International Refugee Protection and Building State Asylum Systems, Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 27, 2017, p. 179.

[33] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026, paras 58-65. For more comprehensive guidance on differentiated processing modalities and systemic issues that impact effective asylum processing, see: UNHCR, Effective processing of asylum applications: Practical considerations and practices, March 2022; UNHCR, Implementing Differentiated Asylum Case Processing Modalities, August 2024; and UNHCR, Aide-Memoire & Glossary of case processing modalities, terms and concepts applicable to RSD under UNHCR's Mandate, 2020.

[34] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026, para. 66.

[35] UNHCR, Protection Policy Paper: The return of persons found not to be in need of international protection to their countries of origin: UNHCR's role, p. 2.

[36] Ibid, p. 2.

[37] See UNHCR, Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems, pp. 33, 36, 97-103, 199-203 and 227; and UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, paras 4 and 198.

[38] UNHCR, Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems, p. 22.

[39] Ibid, p. 22.

[40] UNHCR, International Standards and Core Procedural Safeguards to be Considered in Design of the New Appeals Body, May 2026, paras 16-25.

[41] Asylum Capacity Support Group, Boosting the effectiveness of asylum systems: the impact of legal advice and representation: Outcome Report, November 2024: "The co-facilitators highlighted that while legal advice and representation is widely acknowledged for its crucial role in enhancing the fairness and overall quality of asylum procedures, its impact on the efficiency of these processes is often less recognized. Effective legal advice and representation not only helps asylum-seekers to understand the process, but also enhances the quality of information provided to asylum authorities, resulting in shortened adjudication timelines and fewer appeals and reapplications. Additionally, legal advice and representation is equally critical for rejected asylum-seekers, as it helps explain the reasons for rejection and assist in reopening cases if mistakes were made or if circumstances have changed."

[42] Wilding, J, No Access to Justice 2, 2025.

[43] House of Commons Justice Committee, Access to Justice: Legal Aid, Third Report of Session 2026–27, p. 35.

[44] HM Government, Restoring Order and Control: A statement on the government's asylum and returns policy, p. 22.

[45] Letter from Home Secretary to Chair of the House of Commons Justice Committee, 13 January 2026, p. 2.

[46] UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 25 July 1951, A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1, Section IV B.

[47] UNHCR, Guidelines on International Legal Standards Relating to Family Reunification for Refugees and Other Beneficiaries of International Protection, 2024, pp. 4-5 and 16-17.

[48] HM Government, Restoring Order and Control: A statement on the government's asylum and returns policy, p. 14.

[49] Currently, the sponsor must have an income of £29,000 per annum, though with provision for savings and income from a limited number of other sources to be taken into account in certain circumstances. See: Immigration Rules Appendix FM: family members, para. E-ECP.3.1 etc.

[50] In a similar vein, the Home Secretary stated at the second reading of this Bill: "We need to ensure that we have more parity of treatment between those who are ultimately recognised as refugees and other migrants who come to this country—and indeed British citizens who may marry from abroad but are subject to different rules that do not apply to their refugee counterparts. I think there is a need to bring some coherence to the family reunification system, and to ensure that we have an approach that is fair to all the sorts of people who make claims for family reunification." See: Hansard, Immigration and Asylum Bill, Volume 789, debated on 13 July 2026, Column 667.

[51] Mugenzi v. France, Application No. 52701/09, ECtHR, 10 July 2014 (in French). European Union (EU): Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family Reunification, 2003/86/EC, recital 8. UNHCR, Submission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the case of J.K. v. Switzerland (Application No. 15500/18) before the ECtHR, 28 May 2019, para. 3.2.3.

[52] UNHCR, Observations on "Restoring Order and Control": A Statement on the Government's Asylum and Returns Policy, December 2025, paras 28-29. See also: UNHCR, Refugee Family Reunification: UNHCR's Response to the European Commission Green Paper on the Right to Family Reunification of Third Country Nationals Living in the European Union (Directive 2003/86/EC), February 2012.

[53] UNHCR, Guidelines on International Legal Standards Relating to Family Reunification for Refugees and Other Beneficiaries of International Protection, 2024, p. 24. See also: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Recommendation 1686 (2004) on human mobility and the right to family reunion, 23 November 2004, para. 12.3(d). B.F. and Others v. Switzerland, Applications nos. 13258/18, 15500/18, 57303/18 and 9078/20, ECtHR, 4 July 2023, paras 104-108 and 126-133; UNHCR, Submission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the case of J. K. v. Switzerland (Appl. No. 15500/18) before the ECtHR, 28 May 2019, para. 3.2.5; Dabo v. Sweden, Application no. 12510/18, ECtHR, 18 January 2024, para. 107; UNHCR, The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ('UNHCR') Statement on family reunification for beneficiaries of international protection Issued in the context of the preliminary ruling reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of CR, GF, TY v. Landeshauptmann von Wien (C-560/20), 22 June 2021, Section 4.5; and D.H. and Others v. Sweden, Application no. 34210/19, ECtHR, 25 July 2024, para. 71. An overview of States' laws and practices regarding the application of specific requirements for family reunification is available in: Nicholson, F., The "Essential Right" to Family Unity of Refugees and Others in Need of International Protection in the Context of Family Reunification, January 2018, Second Edition, pp. 96–103.

[54] Tuquabo-Tekle and Others v. The Netherlands, Application no. 60665/00, ECtHR, 1 December 2005, paras 47-50. Jeunesse v. The Netherlands, Application no. 12738/10, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 3 October 2014, para. 118. M.A. v. Denmark, Application no. 6697/18, ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 9 July 2021, para. 135 iv. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, CRC/GC/2005/6, 1 September 2005, para. 77. Brazil Declaration and Plan of Action, 3 December 2014, recommending strengthening the differentiated approach to age, gender and diversity in decisions regarding applications for family reunification. PACE, Resolution 2243 (2018) on family reunification of refugees and migrants in the Council of Europe member States, 11 October 2018, para. 5, stating that children must not be discriminated against based on the family they come from and that particular attention needs to be paid to vulnerable persons.

[55] Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, Application no. 1598/06, ECtHR, 17 January 2012, para. 35. UNHCR, Submission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the case of Abdi Ali Mahamud v. the Netherlands (Appl. no.64534/19) before the ECtHR, 8 April 2021, para. 3.1.7. UNHCR, Amicus curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the case X and THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Record No. 2019/137, 11 December 2019, para. 18, with further sources, and para. 23.

[56] UNHCR, Guidelines on International Legal Standards Relating to Family Reunification for Refugees and Other Beneficiaries of International Protection, 2024, pp. 9-10. See also: UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, 8 April 1988, para. 5; UNHRC, CCPR General Comment No. 19: Article 23 (The Family) Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses, 27 July 1990, para. 2; Dawood and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others; and Thomas and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs and Others, CCT35/99 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC), South Africa: Constitutional Court, 7 June 2000, para. 31; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Inter-American principles on the human rights of all migrants, refugees, stateless persons and victims of human trafficking, Resolution 04/19, 7 December 2019, Principle 32; PACE, Recommendation 1327 (1997) on Protection and Reinforcement of the Human Rights of Refugees and Asylum-seekers in Europe, para. 8.7(o); PACE, Recommendation 1686 (2004) on human mobility and the right to family reunion, 23 November 2004, paras 7 and 8; and PACE, Resolution 2243 (2018) on family reunification of refugees and migrants in the Council of Europe member States, 11 October 2018, para. 3.

[57] Expert Roundtable organized by UNHCR and the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, 8–9 November 2001, 'Summary Conclusions: Family Unity', in E. Feller, V. Türk, and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 604–608, para. 8. UNHCR Expert Roundtable on the Right to Family Life and Family Unity in the Context of Family Reunification of Refugees and Other Persons In Need Of International Protection in Brussels, Belgium, 'Summary Conclusions', 4 December 2017, para. 8. L. v. The Netherlands, Application no. 45582/99, ECtHR, 1 June 2004, para. 36. TB v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, C-519/18, CJEU, 12 December 2019, paras 47 and 77. Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in Need of International Protection, OC-21/14, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 August 2014, para. 272, represents an approach that goes beyond "the traditional notion of a couple and their children" to include other blood relatives and others with no biological relation among whom there are "close personal ties". In 2020, the Council of Europe recalled in its study on standards and practices in family reunification the "need for a more inclusive definition of the family in order to provide for an effective protection of the right to respect for family life to fit the diversity of family situations (dependency, tradition or custom)". Council of Europe, Family Reunification for Refugee and Migrant Children, Standards and promising practices, April 2020, p. 42.

[58] Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], Application no. 48321/99, ECtHR, 9 October 2003, paras 94 and 97. Kumari v. the Netherlands, Application no. 44051/20, ECtHR, 10 December 2024, para. 35. Martinez Alvarado v. the Netherlands, Application no. 4470/21, ECtHR, 10 December 2024, para. 36.

[59] Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, Application no. 1598/06, ECtHR, 17 January 2012, para. 35: "the existence or non-existence of 'family life' is essentially a question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close personal ties". See also Marckx v. Belgium, Application. no. 6833/74, ECtHR, 13 June 1979, para. 31.

[60] UNHCR, Guidelines on International Legal Standards Relating to Family Reunification for Refugees and Other Beneficiaries of International Protection, 2024, para. 13.

[61] Ibid, paras 11-12, noting that the existence of a family is a question of fact involving real and close personal ties and that, where a child's parents separate or divorce, both parents maintain a family relationship with the child and the child with both parents.

[62] Berrehab v. The Netherlands, Application no. 10730/84, ECtHR, 28 May 1988, para. 21: "from the moment of the child's birth and by the very fact of it, there exists between him and his parents a bond amounting to "family life", even if the parents are not then living together." See also: Kroon and Others v. The Netherlands, Application no. 18535/91, ECtHR, 27 October 1994, para. 30; Bundesrepublik Deutschland v XC, C-279/20, CJEU, 1 August 2022, para. 69; and Bundesrepublik Deutschland v SW, BL and BC, Joined Cases C‑273/20 and C‑355/20, CJEU, 1 August 2022, para. 68.

[63] Kroon and Others v The Netherlands, Application no. 18535/91, ECtHR, 27 October 1994, paras 29-30.

[64] UNHCR, Guidelines on International Legal Standards Relating to Family Reunification for Refugees and Other Beneficiaries of International Protection, 2024, paras 13-14.

[65] Ibid, paras 13-14.

[66] It would not be appropriate for the non-permanent absence of cohabitation to found a presumption against family life, as proposed sections 117AA(2)(a) and 117AA(4) would appear to do. This is pertinent to any partner relationship, but the problem with such a presumption is particularly clearly demonstrated in the case of a partnership which has been legally formalised. See, for example, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom, Application nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81, ECtHR, 28 May 1985, para. 62: "Whatever else the word "family" may mean, it must at any rate include the relationship that arises from a lawful and genuine marriage".

[67] Bundesrepublik Deutschland v XC, C-279/20, CJEU, 1 August 2022, paras 65-67. Bundesrepublik Deutschland v SW, BL and BC, C-273/20 and C-355/20, CJEU, 1 August 2022, para. 68.

[68] Explanatory Notes to the Immigration and Asylum Bill, p. 4.

[69] Ibid, p. 4-5.

[70] UNHCR, Observations on "Restoring Order and Control": A Statement on the Government's Asylum and Returns Policy, December 2025, paras 12-35.

[71] Hansard, Immigration and Asylum Bill, Volume 789, debated on 13 July 2026, Column 673.

[72] Note UNHCR's previous observations on the meaning attributed to Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention in UK statute: UNHCR, Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill, as amended - updated January 2022, paras 241-245; and UNHCR, Updated Observations on the Border Security Asylum and Immigration Bill, paras 79-88.

[73] See: UNHCR, Expulsion of refugees involved in committing serious crimes in host countries, 21 August 2026.

[74] M v Ministerstvo vnitra, C-391/16, C-77/17 & C-78/17, CJEU, 14 May 2019, paras 93-112.

[75] Home Office, Asylum seekers will pay towards costs of accommodation, 30 June 2026.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Immigration Act 1971, s. 24B. Immigration Rules, HC 395, Part 11B, para. 360.

[78] Zimmerman, Andreas; Einarsen, Terje; and Herrmann, Franziska M., The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, Oxford University Press, 2024, p. 1375.

[79] Ibid, p. 1375.

[80] Robinson, Nehemiah, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons: Its History and Interpretation, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 1997.

[81] Hathaway, J.C., The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2021, p.661: "There is support for this broad reading not only in the unusually sweeping language of the article itself, but also in the rejection by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries of a proposed exception that would have allowed governments to continue to impose a refugee-specific stamp duty to issue identity cards, residence permits, and travel documents. Even though such levies were to be "wholly applied for the relief of refugees," the drafters viewed them as an unacceptable infringement of the duty to tax refugees and nationals on the same basis."

[82] UNHCR, ExCom: Note on Determination of Refugee Status under International Instruments EC/SCP/5, para. 5. G v G [2021] UKSC 9, UK Supreme Court, 19 March 2021, para. 81.

[83] Professor Guy S. Goodwin-Gill writes that recognition as a refugee "will raise a strong presumption that the refugee should be considered as lawfully staying in the territory of a contracting State. It would then fall to that State to rebut the presumption by showing, for example, that the refugee was admitted for a limited time and purpose, or that he or she is in fact the responsibility of another State." Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., The Refugee in International Law, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 309.

[84] UNHCR, Local integration: "Local integration is a complex and gradual process with legal, economic, social and cultural dimensions. … In many cases, acquiring the nationality of the country of asylum is the culmination of this process." Khan, F. and Ziegler, R., 'Refugee Naturalization and Integration', in Costello, Cathryn; Foster, Michelle; and Jane McAdam (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law ('Oxford Handbook'), OUP 2021, p. 1053-1054: "It is noteworthy that the term "assimilation" has virtually vanished from instruments and policy documents pertaining to treatment of refugees in host countries."

[85] UNHCR, ExCom, Conclusion No. 104 (LVI): Local Integration, 7 October 2005, preamble and para. D.

[86] Grahl-Madsen, Atle, Commentary of the Refugee Convention 1951 (Articles 2-11, 13-37), Article 34.

[87] UNHCR, Refugee Resettlement: An International Handbook to Guide Reception and Integration, September 2002, p. 100-102.

[88] HM Government, Refugee integration loan – How you're paid.

[89] Liddell, B.J. et al., 'Understanding the effects of being separated from family on refugees in Australia: a qualitative study', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, 2022, Vol. 46 (5), pp. 647-653. Fogden, G.; Berle, D; and Steel, Z., 'The Impact of Family Separation and Worry About Family on Psychological Adjustment in Refugees Resettled in Australia', Journal of Traumatic Stress, 2020, Vol. 33, pp. 894-907. Nickerson, A. et al., 'The impact of fear for family on mental health in resettled Iraqi refugee community', Journal of Psychiatric Research, 2010, Vol. 44, pp. 229-235. Rousseau, C.; Mekki-Berrada, A.; and Moreau, S., 'Trauma and extended separation from family among Latin American and African refugees in Montreal', Psychiatry, 2001, Vol. 64 (1), pp. 40-59.

[90] Miller, A. et al., 'Understanding the mental health consequences of family separation for refugees: Implications for policy and practice', American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 2018, Vol. 88 (1), pp. 26-37. Hungerbühler, H., Family reunification: an important aspect for health and integration, Swiss Red Cross, 2023, Section 4.2.3 (in German).

[91] Beaton, E.; Musgrave, A.; and Liebl, J., Safe but not settled: The impact of family separation on refugees in the UK, Refugee Council and Oxfam, 21 January 2018. Walther, L. et al., Living conditions and the mental health and well-being of refugees: Evidence from a large-scale German panel study, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2019. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Chapter 4: Family ties: How family reunification can impact migrant integration', in International Migration Outlook, 15 October 2019. Liddell, B.J. et al., 'Understanding the effects of being separated from family on refugees in Australia: a qualitative study', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, 2022, Vol. 46 (5), pp. 647–653. Hungerbühler, H., Family reunification: an important aspect for health and integration, Swiss Red Cross, 2023, Section 4.3.

[92] Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s. 95(3).

[93] Home Office, Assessing destitution, 23 August 2023.

[94] The Asylum Support Regulations 2000, s. 10(2).

[95] House of Commons Library, Research Briefing: Poverty in the UK: Statistics, 10 July 2026, p. 80. See also: Department for Work and Pensions, Households Below Average Income: An analysis of the UK income distribution: FYE 1995 to FYE 2025, 26 March 2026.

[96] UNHCR notes that the repayment obligation would also apply to those whose asylum applications are not successful. This would include those given leave to remain on another basis. The considerations set out in the text above related to the impact on well-being, self-reliance, family life and integration prospects are also relevant for these individuals.