Inspection highlights lack of intelligence and poor data collection and reporting in relation to maritime threats
A new 'General Maritime' inspection report by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) was published yesterday, the first to be released under the new Chief Inspector, John Tuckett, though the inspection itself was carried out under his predecessor, David Bolt.
You can download the 108-page report here.
The inspection examined Border Force's approach to protecting the UK border from threats in the General Maritime (GM) domain. It assessed national and regional levels of GM operational activity, the resources allocated to this work and the outcomes achieved. Inspectors also reviewed how Border Force engages with stakeholders, the reporting system for pleasure craft arrivals in the UK, and progress made against previous ICIBI recommendations from the 2023 re-inspection of Project Kraken at small seaports. The inspection did not, however, cover small boat crossings in the English Channel.
Overall, the then Independent Chief Inspector, David Bolt, found that while the specific risks in the GM domain have evolved, the underlying challenges remain much the same. The UK's extensive coastline continues to offer opportunities for smugglers of people and goods, posing a significant logistical and resource challenge for Border Force. An effective response depends on close cooperation between Border Force, the Ministry of Defence, and police forces, alongside sustained investment in new vessels and staff training. Although the need for a coordinated multi-agency strategy and fleet renewal has been recognised for years, Bolt noted that progress has been slow.
Inspectors noted that Border Force's ageing fleet requires extensive maintenance to remain operational, reducing availability for frontline activity. Plans for a Maritime Capability Replacement Programme are in place, but new vessels are not expected before 2029.
The report stated: "As of October 2024, the Border Force fleet comprised five cutters (although one, HMC Protector, was due to be scrapped), six [coastal patrol vessels], four mobile [rigid-hull inflatable boat units] and six [tactical watercraft]. Inspectors were told that the cutters were 'between 20 and 25 years old'. Due to their age, they require significant maintenance, break down frequently, and are undergoing a 'life extension programme' one vessel at a time."
The report described GM as still being treated as the "poor relation" of other border protection areas such as General Aviation. It identified ongoing weaknesses in intelligence gathering, data recording, and training, as well as a lack of strategic understanding of GM threats and vulnerabilities. Bolt called for improved record-keeping, better evaluation of operational deployments, and stronger workforce planning to address critical skill gaps.
On the subject of clandestine entry, the report noted: "There is evidence of vessels such as yachts and fishing boats being used by migrants to enter the UK clandestinely, crossing from the near Continent to points along the south and east coasts. Incidents of clandestine entry involving GM had been intercepted, mostly at ports rather than at sea."
Inspectors found that Border Force was unable to provide clear or reliable data on the number of people detected arriving clandestinely by GM routes. Although such incidents are recorded on Border Force's internal PRONTO system, the data is not categorised in a way that allows for easy identification of clandestine arrivals or stowaways. The Home Office's main caseworking system, Atlas, contains no tag to indicate cases linked to GM. Despite these gaps, Border Force supplied what it described as "best effort" figures, estimating that just 89 clandestine arrivals were detected between 1 January 2022 and 31 August 2024. The report highlights these data limitations as a significant obstacle to understanding the true scale of GM threats and to assessing the effectiveness of Border Force's operational response.
On data management, the report stated bluntly: "As is common to many areas of the Home Office's Migration and Borders (M&B) System, inspectors found that data collection and reporting in relation to GM was poorly managed. This meant that GM threats were not well enough understood and not readily quantifiable. This in turn affected the priority that was attached to Border Force's response, and, while inspectors found examples of localised risk testing and intensification exercises, some of which were aimed at addressing intelligence gaps identified in threat assessments, Border Force had no overall national plan for GM, and regions and ports had developed their own approaches, as the 'GM Strategic Review' had highlighted."
More generally on the lack of detailed intelligence and a comprehensive understanding of maritime threats, the ICIBI noted: "While the threats and risks associated with GM are understood in broad terms, knowledge of the detail remains poor. It is hard to see how Border Force and partner agencies can create an effective strategy and operational response to GM threats without a comprehensive picture of the locations around the UK where GM vessels can arrive, yet efforts to document this have been half-hearted to date. Similarly, there needs to be an overhaul of record keeping in relation to GM-related activity by Border Force staff and Field Intelligence Officers, and of the evaluation of operational deployments by BFMC, in order to create and maintain an informed picture of GM threats, trends, actions, and outcomes that is capable of supporting operational and strategic decision making regarding priorities, deployments, resourcing, and investments."
Nine recommendations were made by the ICIBI, mainly aimed at practical improvements, while two further recommendations advised against further action on certain reporting processes until more detailed planning and resources are in place. The Home Office's response to the report is available here. All of the ICIBI's recommendations were either fully of partially accepted.