The sheer extent of coverage, and speculation as to the implications, of Eyre J's ruling in Epping Forest District Council v Somani Hotels Limited (19 August 2025) has a whiff of the silly season about it: the principles in the case law have not moved on substantively since my 14 January 2024 blog post Accommodating Asylum Seekers: Some Recent Planning Law Cases.
Eyre J's judgment is a useful analysis of familiar principles. Why is it headline news then?
A whiff of the silly season but an even more pungent and worrying whiff of political opportunism – the Conservative party leader tonight (20 August 2025) encouraging all Tory-led local authorities to follow Epping Forest's lead (despite the previous Government having set up this whole arrangement in the first place whereby hotels are block-booked by the Home Office via intermediary companies) and the Reform party leader encouraging more protests.
My personal view is that I'm not at all sure that we in the planning world should accept the planning system being used by politicians like this – whether to bash the government or to pursue largely misguided or misdirected campaigns against those who beyond doubt are vulnerable and in need. This is an issue for government to address, rather than to be fought out hotel by hotel via arguments about whether there has been a material change of use, based on old and inadequate case law. Particularly given that, if the statistics are to be believed, the use of hotels for asylum seeker accommodation is being reduced in any event and, to state the obvious, whilst the processing of asylum claims still needs to be sped up, these people need to be accommodated somewhere!
For those wanting to rely on the case, I draw attention to three key points:
This judgment is about an application for an interim injunction
The issue before Eyre J, as was the position in the Great Yarmouth and other cases mentioned in that January 2024 blog post, was whether to grant an interim injunction ahead of a full hearing of the case – and it is crucial to remember that the question of whether an interim injunction is to be ordered is down to the judge determining the "balance of convenience" on the specific facts of the particular case. Lawyers will be familiar with the American Cyanamid [1975] AC 396 test, which Eyre J summarises by reference to the later Sabmiller Africa v East African Breweries case [2009] EWHC 2140: "If the court is satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried, it must go on to consider whether the claimant would be adequately compensated in damages and whether the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them. If the answer to both of those questions is in the affirmative, no injunction should normally be granted. If not the court must consider whether the defendant would be adequately compensated under the claimants undertaking as to damages in the event of his succeeding at trial. If the answer to that question is "yes" the fact that the defendant may succeed at trial is no bar to the grant of an injunction. Where there is doubt as to the adequacy of damages for both parties the court must determine where the balance of convenience lies. If matters are evenly balanced it may be wise to take such measures as are calculated to preserve the status quo…A fundamental principle is that the court should take whatever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been the "wrong" course – in the sense that the court either grants an injunction which should have been refused or refuses to grant an injunction that should have been granted."
Eyre J weighs up the factors in favour of an interim injunction at paragraphs 105 to 112 and those against at 114 to 116. The factors that weighed in favour included that the defendant hotel company had not made an application for planning permission or for a certificate of lawful use. The judge gave limited weight to "the fear of crime resulting from the use of the Bell; the need to address lawful protests; and the consequences of the actions taken to address unlawful activity."
There is no final judgment as to whether there was a material change of use requiring planning permission
The court has expressly not reached any final judgment as to whether the accommodation of asylum seekers at the hotel amounted to a material change of use. Indeed, the council sought an interim declaration to that effect, which the court refused: "Although, as will be seen below, there is considerable force in the Claimant's arguments that there has been a change of use the Defendant has counter-arguments which cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. In addition, as I have already explained, the question of the proper characterization of the use is fact-sensitive and for that reason alone this is not a case where an interim declaration is appropriate. Further, the second element of the proposed declaration, namely that the current use is not a permitted use, does not follow from the first element, namely that the current use is not use as a hotel. As Holgate J explained in Ipswich there will only have been development if there has not only be a change of use but if that change of use has been material. It follows that a declaration that the current use was not use as a hotel would not resolve matters and the court is not in a position at this stage to make a declaration that any change has been material."
Eyre J does embark upon some analysis, although subject to this health warning:
"In doing so I am mindful that the case remains at the interim stage where there is limited evidence (and markedly less detailed evidence than could be expected at a final hearing and even more so than would be available if the matter were being considered at a planning appeal before an inspector); where the parties have had limited opportunity to advance detailed arguments; where the court's opportunity for mature reflection is limited; and where the issues involve questions not only of fact but also of planning judgement."
"There are a number of factors which operate against a finding that there has been a change of use. The principal ones are:
i) There have been no internal structural changes in the Bell.
ii) The external appearance of the Bell is unaltered – the presence of security fencing erected to address recent unlawful hostile activity is to be disregarded for these purposes.
iii) The Defendant's staff continue to operate the facilities at the Bell and to provide the services there.
iv) Catering, cleaning, and related services are provided for those accommodated at the Bell in the same way as they previously were for hotel guests."
There are, however, other factors which would support a finding of a change of use namely:
i)Those accommodated are all of one category of person namely single male asylum seekers.
ii) The entirety of the Bell is devoted to providing accommodation for those persons pursuant to an agreement with CTM and is to be so devoted for a significant period of time (it is the latter element which distinguishes the situation from that of a block booking of a hotel for conference or training course).
iii) Those accommodated have no choice in the location of the premises in which they are placed. They did not choose to come to the Bell and have no control over how long they are to stay there.
iv) None of those accommodated are paying for themselves.
v) Those accommodated have no choice as to their rooms nor as to those with whom they are to share. In most cases they will be sharing rooms with persons with whom they were not previously acquainted.
vi) None of those accommodated in the Bell has anywhere else to live in the United Kingdom.
vii) The Defendant is required to follow the instructions of the Home Office (presumably mediated through CTM) as to the room in which and with whom the asylum seekers are to be placed. The Defendant is expressly prohibited from agreeing to any requests for an upgrade of accommodation.
viii) Those accommodated in the Bell may come and go as they please but any of them who intends to leave for more than one day must obtain prior authorisation from the Home Officer. In addition if any resident is not seen for more than one day the Defendant is required to notify CTM and the Home Office. The Defendant is also required to obtain a signature from each resident each day.
ix) Security staff and a welfare officer are present to protect the residents and to attend to their welfare needs.
x) None of the facilities of the Bell are available for use by non-residents.
In considering the strength of the Claimant's case on this question I have had regard to Holgate J's reminder that the Court of Appeal has said that the distinction between hotel and hostel use is a fine one. Although a fine one the distinction is a real one and I come back to the point that the question is not whether the current use is as a hostel but whether there has been a change from use as a hotel. In light of the factors I have just set out there is very considerable force in the contention that there has been such a change here. Mr Coppel's point that "the Bell is not a hotel for those who are placed there" is a powerful one.
I turn to the question of whether such change of use as there has been was material for the relevant planning purposes. In that regard it is "relevant to consider not only the on- site but also the off-site effects of the character of the use of the land" (Holgate J in Ipswich at [69]. There are a number of factors which support the Claimant's contention that the change was a material one:
i) The nature of the on-site operation has changed in the extensive ways I have set out above.
ii) The opportunity for use of the Bell by members of the wider community has gone. It no longer provides a resource for dining, receptions, functions, and the like. I do not overlook the fact that such use has been very markedly reduced for a number of years but any scope for such use has totally gone for the duration of the use of the Bell under the contract with CTM.
iii) In addition, it is at least arguable that the contribution which those currently resident at the Bell can make to the local community will be different from that which could have been made by visitors to a hotel. Those currently resident there are all single males who will be resident for a significant period of time; who are resident there without choice; and who ex hypothesi are destitute or at risk of destitution (otherwise the Secretary of State would not be under a duty to accommodate them). Through no fault of theirs the contribution they can make (particularly in the form of the use of local services) and the role they can play in the community is different from that of those visiting a hotel in a particular place for business or leisure purposes.
I remind myself of the limitations of the material before me and of the need for considerable caution in making an assessment of the prospects at the interim stage. Nonetheless, the strength of the Claimant's contention that there has been a material change of use is such that it operates as a factor in favour of the grant of an injunction in assessing where the balance of convenience falls."
Each case is to be approached on its own facts
"… the outcome of this application turns on technical issues about the rules of Planning law and on the application of the established principles governing the circumstances in which a court should grant or refuse interim relief. It will be seen from the analysis I set out below that the application of those rules and principles to particular circumstances is acutely fact sensitive."
The hotel and the Home Office (which sought to participate in this case at a late stage) are reportedly applying for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Will we now see other local planning authorities seeking to take similar action? Politics, politics. Will they succeed? Whether or not Eyre J's interim injunction is allowed to stand, we still await the final High Court ruling later this year (assuming the case does not become academic in the meantime).