Limited awareness of Red Notice abuse poses serious risks for UK immigration and asylum cases

House of Lords
House of Commons

Joint Committee on Human Rights

Transnational repression in the UK

Seventh Report of Session 2024–25 HC 681 / HL Paper 160

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4 INTERPOL and visa applications

The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL)

64. INTERPOL's Notice [126] and Diffusion [127] mechanisms are vital tools for global safety. [128] Yet, despite INTERPOL's constitutional prohibition on politically motivated Notices, these mechanisms are being systematically exploited by authoritarian states as TNR tools. [129] Red Notices [130] are routinely used to pursue political opponents, human rights defenders, and journalists beyond national borders. [131] We heard Red Notices likened to "the sniper rifle of autocrats… long-distance, targeted, and highly effective". [132] States also often coordinate their efforts, with multiple countries supporting each other's abusive requests. [133] Currently there is no requirement or mechanism for INTERPOL or the Home Office to alert people at risk of politically motivated reprisals by foreign governments of a Red Notice being issued against them. [134]

65. Politically motivated Red Notices have a profound and far-reaching impact on the individuals targeted. [135] Such Notices may severely restrict a person's ability to travel, access financial services or maintain legal residency abroad. Rhys Davies, Barrister, Temple Garden Chambers, told us that a Red Notice:

Can ruin your life… You will be in constant fear that, if you were to go on holiday to Spain, an overzealous passport control officer might think they have an international super-criminal… and will detain you. There is no aspect of your life that this will not touch upon. [136]

There is often no way for an individual to know whether they are subject to a Red Notice. Individuals are often required to make direct enquiries to INTERPOL to determine whether they are subject to a Red Notice, a process that can take several months. This lack of transparency can leave individuals uncertain as to whether they can travel safely without risking detention. [137]

66. The Committee received evidence on the conduct of individual member states alleged to have engaged in systematic misuse of INTERPOL mechanisms. We were told that misuse of INTERPOL Notices was widespread, but that China, Russia, and Turkey were the most prolific abusers of INTERPOL's Notice system. [138] China was said to employ a distinct strategy, using INTERPOL Notices to locate individuals and then applying coercive pressure, through threats to family members, to compel their return. The Committee also heard that Turkey had begun to misuse Interpol's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database by falsely reporting documents as stolen, thereby facilitating the return of targeted individuals.

67. In recent years, INTERPOL has undertaken a number of measures to strengthen the integrity of its systems. Despite confidence by the organisation that these measures work, [139] attempted Red Notice abuse continues. In 2016, a dedicated Notices & Diffusions Task Force (NDTF) was created within INTERPOL's General Secretariat, with responsibility for conducting a robust quality and legal compliance review for all incoming Notices and Diffusions prior to their publication. The Government has also seconded two individuals to the NDTF. [140] A Home Office official told us that this is "an effective way of helping to ensure that Interpol's processes and safeguards are properly adhered to". [141] However, we were told that despite the creation of the NDTF very few Red Notices (around 6%) are refused in the first instance. [142]

68. INTERPOL has also set up a Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files (CCF), an independent body which is responsible for deciding on a request for deletion and/or correction of data related to an INTERPOL Notice. However, the CCF has been "experiencing delays in meeting its deadlines due to increases in [its workload]". In addition to managing this increase, the CCF faces the task of clearing its backlog of cases. [143] We were told that this means it can take "years" for politically motivated Red Notices to be removed, [144] during which time these individuals face severe restrictions on travel and are at risk of detention. [145]

69. The Home Office and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) often work closely together on lobbying and diplomatic engagement. However, we were unable to establish in any detail how coordination is conducted on INTERPOL related issues and no details were given on how individuals who have been subject to a politically motivated Red Notice might be supported by the Government. Whilst there may be many legitimate reasons why some individuals should not be informed of the existence of Red Notices against them, we were told that there may be some circumstances where the Government should consider making exceptions to the rule of non-disclosure. Rhys Davies told us:

There must be a way to devise appropriate checks and balances—such as enabling a judge to scrutinise which Red Notices are extant against British nationals and say whether those could be disclosed. [146]

70. International human rights lawyers Ben Keith and Rhys Davies told us that the UK could help prevent abuse of INTERPOL mechanisms by engaging more proactively with INTERPOL and advocating for reform. [147] While the UK has previously demonstrated its diplomatic influence and lobbying ability, working alongside its 'Five Eyes' partners [148] to block the election of controversial candidates to the role of INTERPOL President, witnesses expressed concern that the UK's role in shaping INTERPOL's strategic direction remains limited. [149] Rhys Davies told us that when it comes to international leadership on INTERPOL, often "the ship is being steered by others', with the UK's role in shaping INTERPOL's strategic direction appearing limited. [150]

71. CONCLUSION
We are deeply concerned by the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices by certain member states. Refusal by the INTERPOL secretariat to acknowledge that there is a problem and to take remedial action poses a significant threat to the rights and freedoms of individuals targeted by authoritarian regimes and sends a message that this behaviour is acceptable.

72. RECOMMENDATION
We recommend the Government works with 'Five Eyes' and other partners to track and expose malicious, vexatious, and politically motivated use of Red Notices by member states. In doing so, the Government should advocate for greater transparency and accountability within INTERPOL's procedures and advocate for the use of corrective measures and suspensions for systematic abusers of INTERPOL mechanisms.

73. CONCLUSION
Currently there is no requirement for INTERPOL to alert people at risk of politically motivated reprisals by foreign governments of a Notice being issued against them. This lack of transparency is particularly problematic in cases where individuals face credible risk of TNR, effectively restricting their ability to travel freely. Whilst there may be many legitimate reasons why some individuals should not be informed of the existence of Red Notices against them, we see a need for greater support for those whose lives are impacted by attempts to use this system maliciously.

74. RECOMMENDATION
While the option exists for individuals to request access to or removal of their data via INTERPOL's independent oversight body, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files, this process is often significantly delayed and may not offer timely protection to those at immediate risk. The Government should undertake a review of existing procedures to consider whether it is possible to introduce a formal mechanism by which the Home Office or the National Crime Agency (NCA) may alert individuals of the existence of a Red Notice or Diffusion where there is a strong basis to believe it has been politically motivated.

75. RECOMMENDATION
In addition, the Government should take proactive steps to protect individuals facing an extradition risk due to a politically motivated Red Notice. A voluntary mechanism should be introduced to allow targeted British Nationals to notify the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) of planned travel to high-risk countries. This would give UK missions advance notice and allow them to prepare for early intervention if needed.

Impact on visa applications

76. INTERPOL Red Notices can have a significant impact on immigration and asylum applications. The presence of a politically motivated Red Notice may lead to an automatic presumption of criminality, resulting in the refusal of applications for asylum or citizenship. The Government told the Committee that:

There are clear procedures in place to ensure that INTERPOL notices do not unfairly influence immigration decisions. Where an asylum claim is refused and the Notice comes from the applicant's country of origin, the case may be referred to the National Crime Agency (NCA) or extradition authorities. [151]

77. However, witnesses argued that there was a need for enhanced training for Home Office officials on the use and implications of politically motivated INTERPOL Red Notices in asylum and immigration cases. Ben Keith, Barrister at 5 St Andrew's Hill, said that:

If somebody applies for a visa to come to the United Kingdom with a Red Notice against them, you might assume they were a criminal. It might be from Russia; it might be from another state. They might have been a former politician. There is a significant lack of education [in the Civil Service] about trying to analyse whether a Red Notice is in fact genuine. [152]

Country Policy and Information Notes, used in assessing asylum claims, do not contain specific information on threats related to TNR. [153] We heard that once a Red Notice was in place, it required significant funding, expertise and time to properly to challenge it in relation to an immigration or asylum decision.

78. CONCLUSION
The presence of a politically motivated INTERPOL Red Notice can have serious implications for individuals seeking asylum or applying for visas, often resulting in automatic refusal without due consideration of the underlying political context.

79. RECOMMENDATION
The Home Office should ensure that all relevant immigration staff are adequately trained and informed about the potential misuse of Red Notices. In addition, the Country Policy and Information Notes used in assessing asylum claims should be revised to explicitly address the threat of transnational repression. The Government should update the Committee within six months, outlining what specific steps it has taken to improve training for Home Office staff around politically motivated Red Notices.

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[153] Dr John McDaniel (Lecturer in Law at Lancaster University) (TRUK0149)